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Globalization and Sustainability:
The Machine in the Global Garden
C. Ford Runge
It is quite easy to fancy a state of society, vastly different from ours,
existing in some unknown place like heaven; it is much more difficult to realise as a
fact that the order of things with which we are familiar has so little stability that
our actual descendants may be born into a world as different from ours as ours is
from that of our ancestors of the pleistocene age.
J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress, p. 351.         
I.  Introduction:  An Old Story in a New Version
"The genius of sustainable development," it is suggested, "is to finesse the perceived
conflict between economy and environment and between the present and future" (Board of
Sustainable Development, 1997, p. 13).  Webster's defines "finesse" as to "handle delicate
situations diplomatically," or, in the context of bridge or whist, "an attempt to take a trick with a
lower card while holding a higher card" (Webster's New World Dictionary).  In this paper I will
explore some reasons why winning this trick is so difficult, focusing specifically on the deep-
rooted tensions between sustainability and globalization, and the need for more detailed empirical
research on their interaction.
Both sustainability and globalization are obviously ambiguous terms, chosen to describe
different things by different parties, and valued as much for their ambiguity (the diplomatic form
of finesse) as for their definition.  Yet as A. K. Sen (1980) noted, description is a form of choice,
upon which empirical prediction and normative prescription are ultimately founded.  To choose to￿
be ambiguous in describing a phenomenon is thus to encourage conflicting empirical predictions
and valuative prescriptions in the name of "finesse."
"Globalization" nearly always describes international economic competition and its impact
on "connectedness," specifically, the increasing transboundary flows of goods, services, bads and
disservices, including not only materiel, but information, environmental pollution, and people. 
"Sustainability" provides similar scope as a covering concept for a wide variety of environmental
and economic initiatives aimed at "meeting the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations" (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987).
What is noteworthy about these concepts is not their obvious ambiguity, but their
reflection of the interplay of two deeper forces at work since the early 19  century, in which
th
natural history is counterpoised with technological change.  It is my view that globalization is a
result of further technological change, and that sustainability is a projection of a view of natural
history.  The International Monetary Fund, in its 1997 World Economic Outlook, focused
specifically on globalization (although not its environmental implications).  The report gave
technology the leading role, noting:
New technological advances have sharply reduced transportation,
telecommunication, and computation costs, greatly increasing the ease with which
national markets may be integrated at the global level.  Economic distances have
shrunk and coordination problems have diminished to such an extent that in many
cases it has become an efficient method of industrial organization for a firm to
locate different phases of production in different parts of the world.  The structure
of foreign trade has increasingly become intra-industry and intrafirm, and foreign
direct investment (FDI) serves as an important vehicle of globalization.  More and
more, countries depend on each other for technology transfer and learn from each
other manufacturing methods, modes of organization, marketing, and product
design.  Research and development (R&D) spillovers are thus another aspect of
economic linkages among countries.  Moreover, these various elements of
globalization--trade, direct investment flows, technology transfers--have become￿
more closely linked and interconnected, and the world economy is becoming, more
and more, the relevant context for economic decisions (pp. 45-46).
A recent report of impacts of globalization on the metropolitan area of Minneapolis-St. Paul also
highlights technology, defining globalization as "a multifaceted process affecting society, politics,
and the economyÆ" involving "rapid advances in the technology of communications and
transportation," and "Æincreased cross border flows of information, goods and people" (Stanley
Foundation, 1997).  
While globalization is a process driven by technology, sustainability seems very clearly to
reflect a perception of man's role in the history of nature.  When stripped of economic or
ecological jargon, the main issues are a concern for the well-being of future generations in the
face of growing pressure on the natural environment to provide a variety of services including
extractable natural resources, waste absorption, and ecological system resilience.  These concerns
have an explicit historical and temporal reference.  Although forward looking, they also reflect
concerns over whether current and past patterns of consumption and production are excessive if
we wish to maintain the welfare of future generations (Toman, et. al., 1995).
Together, globalization and sustainability overlap mainly in terms of the role of technology
both as a destroyer and creator of biological and thus environmental processes.  These
interactions are especially close in the fields of molecular biology and biotechnology (see Ruttan,
1996).  This interplay, brilliantly analyzed as a social process by Leo Marx in The Machine in the
Garden (1964), has attracted adherents to the causes of both the natural world, and the process of
technological innovation.  While the dividing line between celebrants of technology and critics of
its impacts on the natural world are not always clear, the academic disciplines of economics on the￿
one hand and ecology on the other seem to fairly represent these camps, despite a common
etymology founded in ecos (the household) (see Norton and Toman, 1995).
In understanding such disparate reactions, it is important to appreciate that the study of
natural history and technological change coevolved, converged and began to push against one
another at about the same time, roughly in the first half of the 19  century.  As Stephen Ambrose
th
(1996) has written in describing the state of knowledge and technology at the time of Lewis and
Clark's expedition into the uncharted natural wonders of Louisiana:
The Americans of 1801 Æ could not move goods or themselves or
information by land or water any faster than the Greeks and Romans.Æ But only
sixty years later, when Abraham Lincoln took the Oath of Office as the sixteenth
President of the United States, Americans could move bulky items in great
quantity farther in an hour than Americans of 1801 could do in a day, whether by
land (twenty-five miles per hour on railroads) or water (ten miles an hour upstream
in a steamboat).  This great leap forward in transportation -- a factor of twenty or
more -- in so short a space of time must be reckoned as the greatest and most
unexpected revolution of all -- except for another technological revolution, the
transmitting of information.  In Jefferson's day, it took six weeks to move
information from the Mississippi River to Washington, D.C.  In Lincoln's,
information moved over the same route by telegraph almost instantaneously (pp.
53-54).
Thus in the early 19  century was the conviction broken, as Henry Adams wrote, that "what had
th
ever been must ever be" (p. 52).  And so began a distancing of the forces of the garden from the
machine, or in Adam's metaphor, of the virgin and the dynamo.  By the end of the Civil War,
knowledge of the vast natural treasures of not only the American West but the continents of
South America and Africa had increased exponentially, and would continue to do so into and
throughout the 19  century.  Technological progress was equally rapid, entirely changing what J.
th
B. Bury (1932) came to call the "idea of progress," and deepening the capacity of man to affect￿
natural ecosystems as well as to understand the scientific principles underlying them.
In the 20  century, the capacity of technology to completely alter physical landscapes and
th
change the order of natural systems and cycles has become more and more obvious.  Total war, in
Europe and, at the nuclear level, in Japan, has been one example.  Extractive industry, such as
strip mining or widespread clear-cutting of forests, has been another.  These manmade disruptions
have forced us to ask whether technology can continue to act on natural systems without
ultimately destroying them.  Yet at the same time, technology may hold the promise of reducing
some of the ecological impacts of modern production methods, by substituting information or
biological processes (including genetic information) for physical inputs, as in the case of plant
biotechnology.
The current tension between sustainability and globalization is thus a surface phenomenon
reflecting a deeper social and intellectual tectonics, in which views about natural history and
technological change push against one another, a process that has produced numerous efforts to
finesse the fault lines this pressure creates, of which "sustainable development" is only the most
recent.  The dynamic process of this interplay has produced distinct perspectives on technology
and the natural environment:
• A view of technical change that is positively related to nature, capable of both
exploiting but also preserving it, or technological optimism.
• A view of technical change that is negatively related to nature, in which technology
displaces and destroys it, or technology pessimism.
• A separation of nature from technology, which takes a positive and optimistic form,
insofar as technology substitutes for natural systems.
• A separation of nature from technology, which takes a negative and pessimistic form,￿
in which technology drives out natural systems and immisenzes human and other biotic
communities.
As a shorthand, we may think of these as positive complementarity, negative complementarity,











The debate over sustainability and globalization may be located in the space of these
interactions, all of which are illustrated in current debates over plant biotechnology or the
consumption of fossil fuels.  On the one hand, technological optimists see the process of
globalization as productive of positive complements to natural resources or as an outright
substitute for them.  This view appears currently in the embrace of plant biotechnology on the side
of complementarity, and in economic analysis of "backstop technologies" as substitutes for natural
resources that become scarcer and more valuable (see Nordhaus, 1979).  On the pessimistic side,
critics of developments such as biotechnology emphasize its risks to natural biota (e.g., Krimsky
and Wrubel, 1996), and note the potential of such technologies to substitute for and ultimately to￿
drive out genetic diversity and resistance to various plant diseases or pests.  It is interesting that
the Union of Concerned Scientists, forged originally to combat the negative impacts of nuclear
fission and fusion, has recently turned its attention to agricultural biotechnology, suggesting that it
is technological pessimism that unites these two initiatives (see Rissler and Mellon, 1996).
If this analysis is accurate, it suggests that sustainability and globalization are surface
descriptions of deeper issues involving technological change and its impact on the natural
environment, likely to generate entirely different empirical and normative predictions and
prescriptions, depending on which "box" the analyst occupies in describing their interaction a
priori.  To rise above these divisions of opinion it is necessary to consider the empirical record
more carefully.
II.  Two Hypotheses
A hypothesis is a statement subject to confirmation or disconfirmation through testing
with empirical evidence (Quine and Ullian, 1970).  I will offer two broad hypotheses describing
the impacts of globalization on sustainability.  The first is that globalization (defined broadly as
above) is the cause of reduced sustainability of ecological systems, and is in fact destroying them. 
While many have focused on physical environmental resources in this process, there are similar
arguments made respecting labor conditions and cultural resources.  The trade/environment
debate reflects the first issue, on which we will concentrate here.  However, there is an equally
lively debate over labor conditions and standards (including wage levels and worker safety, for
example) and cultural issues such as the preservation of traditional heritage or language.  In all
cases, the hypotheses is that the transboundary flow of goods, services, bads and disservices, part￿
of an elaborated cycle of technological change, negatively affects environmental quality, labor
conditions or traditional culture.  Mowery (1997) has noted that globalization, especially as it
relates to R&D, is an elaborated form of a Raymond Vernon's "product cycle," in which demands
for specific innovations first appear in a "lead market," then are diffused to other markets through
direct foreign investment.  If this process is enlarged to include not only goods but services, bads,
and disservices, globalization represents the diffusion of all of the "products" of technological
change across jurisdictional boundaries.  Tests of this hypothesis suggest a complex picture, in
which the hypothesis is by no means universally accepted.
The second, and in some ways more refined, hypothesis is that globalization, a largely
market-driven phenomenon, carries with it effects that result from the failure of markets to
account for environmental impacts (or, for that matter, labor conditions and cultural effects). 
Analyzing the second hypothesis is somewhat more difficult, but in my judgement more
rewarding, since it leads to a decomposition of both the market and nonmarket impacts of global
trade as they relate to environmental quality (as well as labor conditions and culture).  I shall
argue that the first hypothesis, the "globalization as destroyer" hypothesis, is unduly pessimistic as
description of observable evidence.  When used to describe the environmental impacts of
globalization, it leads to a substantial number of false predictions and prescriptions.  The second,
or market failure, hypothesis is supportable, and implies the need for more substantial institutional
innovations in response to these failures, of which the current world community and many nations
have yet to show themselves capable, with some small but significant exceptions.￿
A.  Globalization as Destroyer
The view that globalization is a dynamo of ecological, worker and cultural destruction has
a substantial following.  William Greider, in One World, Ready or Not, the Manic Logic of Global
Capitalism (1997) argues that excessive levels of output will ultimately lead to global economic
collapse.  David Korten, in his When Corporations Rule the World, has argued explicitly against
globalization and in favor of "localism," largely on the grounds that "maintaining a global
economy allows us to be far less aware of whose resources we are dependent on" (Korten, in
Danaher, 1996, p. 56).  Trade, in this view, is the great destroyer, reflected in other, even more
polemical works such as the recent Corporations Are Gonna Get Your Mama:  Globalization and
the Downsizing of the American Dream (featuring an introduction by Noam Chomsky, and
contributions by Korten, Ralph Nader and others).
The empirical evidence is more complicated.  While it would be too time consuming to
review all of this evidence, the basic findings suggest that trade and associated GDP growth do
lead to increases in various indicators of environment damage, but that in many cases these
indicators then move positively at higher levels of income.  Table 1 provides a summary of a
number of studies examining this so-called "inverted U" or "Kuznets" function (analogous to the
demographic transition hypothesis), in which pollution rises with increases in income at lower
levels of GDP per capita, then begins falling once a threshold is reached.  The table describes data
sources, pollution measures, media and results, as well as the level of GDP per capita at which
various pollution levels peak.
Lucas (Table 2), in a separate analysis, has looked not only at the relation to GDP/capita,
but specifically at the relation between various environmental indicators and trade-openness￿￿
measured by exports/GDP, finding that many pollutants are unassociated with export openness,
and some indicators, such as wilderness area, are positively associated with openness, while
deforestation is negatively associated with it.
In a recent report for the World Resource Institute (Table 3), I and others examined the
relation between changes in export shares in Latin America and the Caribbean for numerous ISIC
sectors, and found that the highest polluting sectors were basic metals, industrial chemicals and
non-metal products, whilst the lowest were textiles and apparel, metal products and food
products.  When export growth in these sectors was examined, it was by no means clear that
export share was growing more rapidly in the highly polluting sectors; if anything, the opposite
trend seemed better supported (Runge, et. al., 1997).Global Environmental Monitoring System
1
 Biochemical Oxygen Demand.
2
 Chemical Oxygen Demand
3
Dissolved oxygen is a positive indicator of environmental quality, hence the relationship is the inverted with respect to the other indicators.  The
4
trough is reported under the pollution  peak column.
 For cubic functional forms the peak level is a local maximum.
5
 Statistics in brackets are standard errors.
6
 Per capita income in purchasing power parity terms came from Summers and Heston (1991).
7
 The authors report a strange relationship with this pollutant.  Total coliforms at first increase with income and then decrease.  However, they then
8
increase dramatically -- within the range of the data.
World Bank Pollution Projection System
9
Table 1.  Summary of Empirical Results on the Relationship between GDP and Environmental Quality.
Authors
Source of GDP GDP per capita in $ 
Data Pollution Measures Pollutants Medium Results Variable at Peak Level of Pollution
Functional
Form for
Grossman and GEMS   Concentration  SO Air Inverted U cubic 4,053     (355)
Krueger  (1995) (units of Dark Matter or Smoke Air Inverted U cubic 6,151     (539)     
1
pollutant/volume of Suspended Particles Air Downward  cubic     NA            
water or air) Lead Water Inverted U cubic 1,887     (2,838)
2
Cadmium Water Inverted U cubic 11,632   (1,096)
Arsenic Water Inverted U cubic 4,900     (250)
Mercury Water Inverted U cubic 5,047     (1,315)
Nickel Water Inverted U cubic 4,113     (3,825)    (1985 
Fecal Coliforms Water Inverted U cubic 7,955     (1,296)     US$ )
Total Coliforms Water Inverted U cubic 3,043     (309)
Nitrates Water Inverted U cubic 10,524   (500)
BOD Water Inverted U cubic 7,623     (3,307)
2
COD Water Inverted U cubic 7,853     (2,235)
3





Lucas, Wheeler, World Bank Emissions (Weight Weight of 320 toxic releases Air, Water Inverted U quadratic 12,500          (1987 US$)
and Hettige  PPS of releases/GDP) and Land
(1992)
9Concentration measures were used for dissolved oxygen and fecal coliform bacteria in rivers.
10
Concentrations in micrograms per cubic meter for suspended particles and SO .
11
2
This measure is for municipal solid waste.
12
This measure is for CO  emissions.
13
2
Total deforestation in hectares since 1961.
14
All variables were log transformed.
15
Selden and Song estimated a fixed effects and random effects model for each pollutant.  The first number is for the fixed effects model and the
16
second for the random effects model.
Table 1.  Summary of Empirical Results on the Relationship between GDP and Environmental Quality, continued.
Authors Data Pollutants Medium Results Variable
Source of Pollution Measures GDP at Peak Level of Pollution
Functional
Form for GDP per capita in $ 
Shafik and World %of population Lack of safe drinking water Water Downward  trend linear, NA
Bandyopadhyay Bank with access to safe Lack of urban sanitation   Downward trend quadratic NA
(1992) drinking water or Dissolved oxygen Water Downward trend and cubic NA
sanitation,  Fecal coliform Water Inverted U then 1375
concentration , Upward trend                              (PPP$)
10
change in forest Annual deforestation Inverted U Not reported
area, Total deforestation Air Inverted U Not reported
concentrations , Suspended Particles Air Inverted U 3280
11
kilograms per SO Land Inverted U 3670
capita , Municipal solid waste Air Upward trend NA
12






Holtz-Eakin and Oak Ridge Emissions CO Air Inverted U quadratic  35428      (1986 US$)
Selden (1992) Nat. Lab. 
2
Selden and Song World Emissions SO Air Inverted U quadratic 8916-10682
(1994) Resource NO Air Inverted U quadratic 12041-21773  (1985 US$)
Institute Suspended Particles Air Inverted U quadratic 9811-9617
2
x
CO Air Inverted U quadratic 6241-19092
16 Weighted average of 320 toxic releases.
17
 Volatile Organic Compounds.
18
 This result was sensitive to inclusion of variables other than income per capita and population.
19
 This result was derived by the author from statistical results in Lucas (1990).
20
 Does not appear to rise or fall with income per capita.
21
 Lucas (1990) reports this as a weak inverted U-shape, but the peak level of income was beyond the range of the data.
22
 This income is outside the range of data.
23
 This estimate was calculated by the author from results provided in Lucas (1996). 
24
Table 1.  Summary of Empirical Results on the Relationship between GDP and Environmental Quality, continued.
Authors Data Pollutants Medium Results Variable Pollution 
Source of Pollution Measures GDP at Peak Level of
Functional
Form for GDP per capita in $ 
Lucas (1996) Oak Ridge Emissions 1000 CO   Air Increasing Trend quadratic  24,568   
National tons, lbs/year/mill- Total Toxic Release All Inverted U  quadratic 10,500
Laboratory, ion US$ of Bioaccumulative Metals All Inverted U quadratic 5,250
World Bank manufacturing BOD Water Inverted U quadratic 17,750
PPS,  World output (toxic Suspended Solids Water Inverted U quadratic 6,300
Resources release and water),  Suspended Particles Air Downward Trend quadratic NA
Institute lbs/yr/thousand SO Air Downward Trend quadratic NA
US$ of NO Air Downward Trend quadratic NA
manufacturing Fine Particles (PM10) Air Downward Trend quadratic NA 
output (air),  Lead Air Downward Trend quadratic NA         (1987 US$)
Area in km , Area VOC Air Inverted U quadratic 20,000
2
in 1000 ha, Wilderness Land Inverted U quadratic 1,715-11,740
Volume km Deforestation Land Inverted U quadratic 1,960
3
(Water), tonnes Fresh Water Withdrawals Water Increasing Trend quadratic NA






Threatened Species: Fish       Inverted U quadratic Not Reported
Amphibians      Increasing Trend quadratic NA
  Reptiles Not Related quadratic NA
  Birds,  Mammals Inverted U quadratic 9,000
CFCs Air Increasing Trend quadratic NA








Table 2.  Estimated Relationship between Environmental Indicators, Growth, and Trade
Environmental Follows Growth in Index" Follows




(1) Annual CO  Emissions 2
2
   (a) Total + 0 0 0 NR
   (b) Solid Fuels + 0 – 0
   (c) Liquid Fuels – 0 0 0
   (d) Gas Fuels + 0 0 +
   (e) Gas Flaring + 0 + –




   (a) All media: total toxics + 0 + + NR
   (b) Water Polluting: BOD 0 0 – 0
   (c) Air Pollution
     i. Suspended Particles 0 0 – +
    ii. SO 0 0 0 0 2
(3) Wilderness Area
3
   (a) Adjusted for Total Area + NR + NR 0
   (b) Adjusted for Agricultural       
  Land Use + NR + NR 0
   (c) Adjusted for Forestry
        Practices + NR + NR –
(4) Deforestation
4
   (a) Adjusted for Total Area + NR – NR –
   (b) Adjusted for Agricultural
        Land Use + NR – NR –
   (c) Adjusted for Forestry
        Practices + NR – NR –
(5) Freshwater Withdrawals
5
   (a) All countries + NR 0 NR +
   (b)  Adjustment for Total
         Water Available + NR 0 NR +
   (c) Adjusted for Agricultural
        Land Use – NR 0 NR +￿￿
Table 2 (concluded)
Environmental GDP/capita Growth in Index" Follows






   (a) Adjusted for Exclusive
        Economic Zone – NR 0 NR 0
   (b) Adjusted for Meat
        Output – NR 0 NR 0
   (c) Adjusted for Freshwater
        Catch and Aquaculture – NR 0 NR 0
(7) Pesticide Use-Active
    Ingredients Used
7
   (a) All countries + NR – NR 0
   (b) Adjusted for Climatic
        Zone + NR – NR 0
Notes to Table:
Entries of +, 0 and – indicate a significantly positive, insignificant and significantly negative statistical association at
1
the one-tailed 95th percentile of confidence, respectively.  These correspond to "positive," "none" and negative in the charts
in Appendix I.
Fixed Effects Time Series Models.  Annual CO  emissions in 1,000 tons for 113 countries.  All media, water pollutants
2
2
and air pollutants measured as emissions flows in lbs. per year per U.S. million dollars of manufactured output for 96
countries.
"Wilderness" defined as a minimum of 4,000 km  showing no evidence of human development.  Data from World
3 2
Resources Institute analysis of aerial photographs.
"Deforestation" in units of 1,000 hectares.
4
"Freshwater withdrawals" in km .
53
"Marine Catch" in 1,000 tons.
6
"Pesticides" in tons of active ingredient.
7
NR indicates not reported.
8
Source:  Adapted from R.E.B. Lucas.  "International Environmental Indicators:  Trade, Income and Endowments."  Chapter
16 in M.E. Bredahl, et. al. (eds.) Agriculture, Trade and the Environment:  Discovering and Measuring the Critical
Linkages.  Boulder, CO:  Westview Press, 1996.￿￿
Table 3.  Changes in Export Shares of Production for Low and High Pollution Intensive Sectors in Latin America
Change in Export Shares of Production
Low-Intensity Polluters
Country Time Period Textiles, Apparel Metal Products Food Products
Argentina 1993 13% 8% 14%
Belize 90 and 92 - Rising (54-58%) Falling (62-53%)
Bolivia 88-91 Rise then fall (19-32%) Rising (2-3%) Rising (9-21%)
Chile 86-91 Rising (2-9%) Falling (45-9%) Steady (18%)
Colombia 86-91 Rising (13-36%) Fall and Rise (5-11%) Rising (3-5%)
Costa Rica 86-91 Rising (27-43%) Fluctuating (24-27%) Rising (7-11%)
Ecuador 86-90 Rising (1-5%) Rising (2-4%) Fall then steady (56-10%)
El Salvador 92 43% 24% 7%
Guatemala 85-88 Rise then fall (19-9%) Rise then Fall (14-6%) Rise then fall (9%)
Honduras 85-88 Steady 5% Fall (6-5%) Falling (9-6%)
Mexico 86-92 Fall then rise (41-51%) Rising (23-61%) Falling (8-4%)
Panama 85-89 Rising (20-43%) Rising (2-8%) Falling (9-5%)
Paraguay 1991 33% 19% 56%
Peru 86-88 Falling (15-8%) Falling (38-32%) Rising (8-22%)
Uruguay 86-90 Falling (57-51%) Falling (9-6%) Fall then Rise (26%)
Venzuala 85-92 Rising (1-4%) Fluctuating (4-7%) Rising (1-3%)
Change in Export Shares of Production
High-Intensity Polluters
Country Time Period Basic Metals Industrial Chemicals Non-Metal Products
Argentina 1993 14% 8% 3%
Belize 90 and 92 - - -
Bolivia 88-91 - - -
Chile 86-91 Rising (48-62%) Rising (7-10%) Rise then Fall (1-3%)
Colombia 86-91 Rising (11-24%) Rising (11-14%) Fall and Rise (8-12%)
Costa Rica 86-91 - Rising (16-21%) Steady (16-15%)
Ecuador 86-90 Rising (0-2%) Fluctuating (1-16%) Rising (0-3%)
El Salvador 92 61% 15% 8%
Guatemala 85-88 Rise then fall (11-2%) Rise then fall (15-8%) Rise then Fall (11-5%)
Honduras 85-88 - Falling (4-3%) Rising (0-6%)
Mexico 86-92 Falling (22-13%) Falling (21-16%) Rise then Fall (14-10%)
Panama 85-89 Rising (11-22%) - Rising (1-6%)
Paraguay 1991 - 47% 0%
Peru 86-88 Rising (3-6%) Steady (10%) Steady (2%)
Uruguay 86-90 Falling (17-13%) Rising (8-13%) Rising (7-13%)
Venzuala 85-92 Falling (61-38%) Falling (60-50%) Falling (19-11%)
Source:   P. McGinnis and P. Faeth, WRI, 1997, in Runge, et. al., 1997.￿￿
Hence, it must be concluded based on the evidence to date that export expansion and
increases in GDP per capita as a measure of globalization are not unambiguously associated with
reduced sustainability of ecological systems; rather, growth in income and exports appears to lead
to increases in environmental damages at lower income levels, followed in some cases by
reduction as incomes increase, implying that income growth is a precondition for environmental
protection.
On the side of wages, recent work has suggested that globalization is associated with the
convergence rather than divergence of wage levels.  The main reason for this is the increase in
real wages in low wage earning countries, which is not accompanied by comparable decreases in
real wages in high income countries.  Williamson (1996), in a study of industrial economies in
three periods (1850-1914, 1914-1950, and 1950-present) finds that in the first and last periods,
globalization and more open trade, as well as mass migration, caused a convergence in real wages,
due to poor countries growing more rapidly than rich, or what new growth theorists call "beta-
convergence," while the protectionism and contraction of the middle period caused a cross-
country divergence.  The process of global integration since 1950 has also involved convergence,
but with the participation of an increasingly large group of countries.  However, there is very little
evidence of widespread net job destruction (see Krugman, 1997).  What is most striking is the
coincidence of this process and the divergence of real wages inside the U.S. economy, a
phenomenon less convincingly laid at the feet of trade than at U.S. social and corporate
compensation policies (see Freeman, 1996).
On the side of cultural diversity, the evidence also supports the proposition that￿￿
convergence, rather than divergence, has resulted, although cultural indicators are less precise
than real wage levels.  In a study of the NAFTA countries using a variety of survey data,
Inglehart, et. al. (1996), found that the U.S., Canada and Mexico were all converging respecting
consensus views of democracy and market processes.  The most striking changes appeared to be
taking place in Mexico, which was moving from a highly centralized to a more pluralistic political
system, a finding confirmed by the results of 1997 elections.  Such changes are less obvious in
Canada and the U.S., but here too movement appears toward higher levels of public participation,
augmented by access among NGOs and others to the information superhighway.  But all of this
evidence, which remains fragmentary, begs the key question:  What are the mechanisms behind
this process?  This brings me to hypotheses number two.
B.  The Machine of Trade in the Garden of the World Environment
Leo Marx concluded his study of technology and the pastoral ideal (which was largely a
literary exercise) with the prescient remark that "The machine's sudden entrance into the garden
presents a problem that ultimately belongs not to art but to politics" (p. 365).  The mechanisms
by which globalization affect sustainability are not revealed by inverted U-shaped functions, which
hide the political choices leading nations and individuals to respond to pollution as a "public bad." 
(Similar arguments over failures of the market can be made respecting wages, labor conditions
and culture, but will not be pursued here.)  These market failures demand attention to the
incentives of individuals and nations to engage in collective actions to reduce these negative
externalities over time (see Sandler, 1997).  This leads to a decomposition of the impacts of trade
on the environment which can allow us to discern if, how and why certain trends in the data￿￿
occur, such as the inverted "U."  Let me sketch five such impacts of trade on the physical
environment (see Runge, 1995).
The first and most celebrated (since Adam Smith) is allocative efficiency, the persuasive
argument that specialization and comparative advantage more efficiently utilize natural resources
that policies of national or local self-sufficiency, a view in direct contrast to that of Korten and
other advocates of "localism."  The second effect of trade is on the scale of economic activity,
generally measured in terms of GDP per capita, involving the question of whether economic
activity creates more ecological "wear and tear."  The nonlinearities reported in the data
(specifically inverted-U-shaped functions) suggest that other forces are at work, above and
beyond scale effects.  The third effect is on the sectoral composition of output:  are more or less
ecologically threatening sectors favored by trade?  This was the focus of the Latin American
exercise reported on earlier.  A fourth way in which trade may affect the environment is by
inducing technological innovation and transfer -- of both goods and bads.  A final impact is on
policy -- and politics.  Whilst rising incomes may make environmental protection more affordable,
the ultimate question is not only whether populations are able to pay for such protection, but
whether they are willing to pay and can reveal this preference through the political process. 
Market failure is thus joined by the possibility of government failure in causing negative
environment impacts to which societies fail to respond.
Schematically (Figure 2), we can think of trade and globalization as inducing some
allocative efficiencies, leading to increased growth and GDP per capita, with some negative scale
effects.  If these effects lead to increases in demand for environmental protection, revealed in a
political process, then induced technical changes and shifts in composition are more likely.  But￿￿
the critical possibility for disconnection, assuming at least some negative scale effects are not
overcome by allocative efficiencies and market-based technologies, is whether the political
process responds to the need to reduce environmental externalities over time.
This question lies at the heart of the debate over sustainability and globalization. 
Obviously, the political process at both the national and the international level is only beginning to
respond -- and grudgingly.  Moreover, the data suggests that such responses are much less likely
at lower levels of income, even in well-functioning democracies.  In the United States and
Western Europe, environmental responsibility and even corporate environmental activism are very
much in favor with the public and a large part of the private sector.  But in most developing
countries, environmental regulation is regarded as at best an affectation of the rich, and at worst
an excuse to deny market access to Third World exporters as a form of green protection.  The
central conundrum facing global environmental policy is how to connect incentives for upward
harmonization of environmental standards to the dynamic process of trade liberalization, while
avoiding the use of "environmental conditionality" as an excuse for closing off market access (see
Runge, et. al., 1997; Vogel, 1995).  Here, new institutions are required, including the possibility
of a World Environment Organization (WEO), designed to function alongside the World Trade
Organization in Geneva (Runge, et. al., 1994; Esty, 1994).￿￿
Figure 2
Trade Impacts on the Environment
   Trade  ￿  Allocative Efficiency (+)  ￿  Growth in GDP/capita
 ￿  Scale Effects (–)  ￿  Demand for Environmental Protection 
 ￿  Change in Policy  ￿  Change in Composition (+)  ￿  Change in 
   Technology (+).
The plus sign denotes positive and the minus sign negative environmental impacts.
Source:  Runge, 1995, p. 366.￿￿
Conclusions
Let me conclude by suggesting that the reconciliation of globalization and sustainability is
unlikely to occur without political commitments to redirect some of the economic benefits
generated by growth and trade towards targeted environmental improvements.  How and where
to target these improvements requires data on environmental impacts, and attention to the
possibility that environmentalism can be hijacked for purely protectionist purposes.  For these
reasons, any real progress in sustainable development is unlikely until we have a clear empirical
basis allowing interventions that maximize environmental benefits and discourage protectionism in
green guise.  Such detailed analysis and understanding requires investigators to temper a priori
optimism or pessimism, and to admit the possibility of both positive and negative ecological
impacts of globalization.  This goes beyond efforts to finesse deep divisions over the impacts of
economic change on the natural environment, acknowledging negative and positive effects when
and where they occur, and encouraging political and policy decisions that promote positive and
discourage negative impacts.  This view is neither original or new, and is strikingly similar to that
of Pigou's Economics of Welfare (1962).  But the scientific essence of this effort is empirically
accurate description, upon which prediction and prescription can then be built.￿￿
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